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EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN THE U.S.

U.S. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A REVIEW OF CURRENT
LEGISLATION AND A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY FUNDING

ABSTRACT
Recently developed SEC guidelines provide the regulatory framework for Title II of the Jump
Start our Business (JOBS) Act of 2012, which legalizes interstate equity crowdfunding in the
United States. Concurrently, eighteen states have passed legislation or promulgated regulations
that allow intrastate equity crowdfunding. At present, the literature has not addressed what this
nascent funding mechanism will offer to investors, as well as, those seeking funding for
entrepreneurial projects within the U.S. Therefore, this paper provides a review of current U.S.
legislation, discusses the anticipated implications of equity crowdfunding, and develops a
conceptual model that demonstrates potential outcomes.
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Over the last few years, crowdfunding has expanded to create dynamic global funding
networks. Crowdfunding enables projects to be financed via the Internet thru solicitation of small
investments in the form of a donation or in exchange for a reward or voting rights from a large
base of potential backers (Zvilichovsky, Inbar, and Barzilay 2013; Collins and Pierrakis 2012;
Cholakova and Clarysse, 2014; Hemer, 2011; Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010; Kleemann,
Voss and Reider 2008). Bradford (2012) defines crowdfunding as ‘the use of the Internet to
raise money through small contributions from a large number of investorsl’ (1), ‘rather than
professional parties such as banks, venture capitalists or business angels’ (Schwienbacher and
Larralde 2010, 4). Crowdfunding is a unique mechanism for raising funds because it ‘uses
collective decision making via a social media platform to evaluate and raise financing for new
projects or new commercial ventures’ (Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, and Wright 2015, 12).
The literature discusses three main types of crowdfunding: token investment, lending
investment and equity investment. The first, token investment is among the most common and
refers to individuals that give donations to support a cause or project without any expectations of
a financial return. Instead, investors receive either a simple affirmation or non-monetary rewards
based on the level of their contributions. The second type of crowdfunding, lending investment,
refers to investors’ receiving interest on their investment in a company at an established interest
rate. An example is the LendingClub.com, which is a loan-based, crowdfunding portal and
community that connects borrowers with potential investors. For the purposes of this study, we
shall be focusing on the third type, equity crowdfunding (ECF), which refers to investors that
receive shares or units in a business in exchange for their financial investment in that firm.
Equity crowdfunding (ECF) is particularly interesting because the overall global
crowdfunding volume is estimated to increase to $35 billion by 2020 (Blohm, Sieber, Schulz,
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Haas, Leimeister, and Wenzalff 2014), and the equity-based and lending-based crowdfunding
models are expected to expand and reach a market share of approximately 60-80% globally.
According to an Industry report by Mass Solutions (2015), globally ECF raised $11.08 billion
dollars in 2014 and is expected to continue to have accelerated growth by doubling in size
annually over the next few years. Moreover, ECF is expected to overtake venture capital as the
largest source of startup funding by 2020 ($36 billion) (Emmerson 2015).
The first country to adopt equity crowdfunding was the United Kingdom, with
Crowdcube as the first platform, and since that time ECF has rapidly expanded into other
countries. In 2013, the World Bank reported 672 crowdfunding sites and estimated a world
crowdfunding market of $96 billion (Worldbank 2013). However, primarily due to concerns
over the potential for fraud and the need to protect investors (Brutan et al. 2015), the U.S. has
been slow to adopt ECF. Particularly within the U.S., equity crowdfunding has experienced
regulatory roadblocks due to adherence to the regulations of the Securities Act of 1933, but with
the passing of the JOBS Act in 2012 and the finalization of regulations by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 2015, the U.S. legislators established the ECF in the U.S.
The Jump Start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 effectively brings securities
regulation into the era of social networking by enabling ECF to occur via an on-line market
(Miller 2013). With the new regulations in the U.S., research on ECF is nascent, and the extant
literature has not fully addressed the implications of this funding mechanism and the possibilities
it will offer to the “crowd” investors within the U.S. Thus, the transition from token rewardbased funding to equity-based funding via crowdfunding platforms merits further review and
more analysis (Cholokova and Clarysse 2014). Also, since U.S. federal and state legislative
changes are occurring in real time, the equity crowdfunding apparatus and its critical
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implications also merit timely review. Therefore, this paper seeks to provide a systematic review
of the emerging ECF investment environment in the U.S. in three ways: (1) comparing
traditional equity-based financing regulations to the new federal JOBS Act; (2) comparing state
ECF laws to the JOBS Act; and (3) introducing a conceptual model which can be the basis for
future empirical research and theoretical extensions and lastly (4) discussing and depicting some
of the potential implications and the potential of both intrastate and interstate ECF for the
effective funding of future entrepreneurial ventures in the United States.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
With the global expansion of crowdfunding, it has gained more attention however, we
still lack a comprehensive understanding of crowdfunding and many topics related specifically to
ECF (Gierczak, Bretschneider, Haas, Blohm, and Leimeister 2016). Research has primarily
focused on venture capital, bank loans, and angel investments (Bygrave 2009; Moss,
Neubaumm, and Meyskens 2014) or on non-equity (token/reward) crowdfunding rather than
ECF (e.g. Cholakova et al. 2014). Although equity crowdfunding research has been conducted in
other countries (e.g. Décarre and Wetterhag 2014; Hornuf and Schwienbacher 2014b; 2015;
Hornuf and Neuenkirch 2015; Vismara 2015). Research on ECF for non-accredited investors
within the U.S. is rather nascent due to data limitations, particularly in peer-reviewed journals
(Mollick 2014). At present, most of our knowledge on ECF has been obtained from markets
outside the U.S.
Some of the extant research has examined various aspects of crowdfunding such as the
effective use of crowdfunding (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2012), various types of customers
(Ordanini, Miceli, Pizzetti, and Parasuraman 2011), the selection of crowdfunding platforms
(Belleflamme, Paul, Thomas Lambert, and Armin Schwienbacher, 2014), , the decisions made by
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investors, as well as, the geographical bias of investors (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2011;
Lin and Visvanathan 2015), the motivations of individual investors (Cholokova and Clarvasse
2014), and the information dimensions to attract investors (Parker 2014). Another study by
Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther, and Schweize (2012) pursued empirical research by utilizing the
Australian ASSOB platform as the source of their ECF data. Their study showed that in the
Australian market, successful equity crowdfunding initiatives rely on equity retention decisions
and detailed information on investor risks, including credible signals, quality of the start-up, and
sound information disclosure to the “crowd.” Other equity crowdfunding studies showed that
accumulated capital that is invested in projects can serve as an informative, but noisy, signal of
project quality (Agrawal et al. 2011; Burtch, et al. 2013). Another study by Cholokova and
colleagues (2014) examined the motivations of individuals to pledge to reward-based projects and
invest in equity-based platforms and showed that investing for equity is a positive predictor of
keeping the pledge. Other studies have reviewed the information dimensions. For example, the
work by Parker (2014) investigated the information dimension in equity crowdfunding and
showed that “information cascades” can mitigate the problem of thoroughly communicating
private company information, but also that without inclusive information “cascades” investors
will tend to spread (financial) resources so thinly that few good projects achieve the funding that
they require.
Some commonalities that have been identified thru the research in both non-equity and
equity crowdfunding indicate various factors that should be considered for a successful
crowdfunding experience which include:


the importance of entrepreneurial signaling to small investors regarding the value of the
project. The findings of Ahlers, et.al. (2012) for entrepreneurs utilizing crowdfunding
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showed that signaling elements such as performance based signals (financial projects and
strategic plans) can increase the likelihood of success. Moreover, structure of firm
internal governance structure can enhance the likelihood of attracting investors and the
speed of raising capital.


the importance of having efficient public information retrieval via social media. Parker’s
(2014) study showed that investors face asymmetric interactions, but that information
cascades can mitigate the problem.



consideration of the inherent geographical bias that may potentially occur. Lin and
Vishvanathan’s (2014) study showed that home bias exists in the virtual marketplace
whereby investors will forgo a better alternative (lower risk, high return) in favor of
investing in their home state. Agrawal and associates (2011) discuss the importance of
geographical dispersion of investors, especially during early financing stages.



the importance of establishing relationships and legitimacy using the crowdfunding
infrastructure. Schwienbacher and Lerralde (2012) stress the importance of building a
community of crowdfunders for greater engagement as well as developing the ability to
tailor crowdfunding initiatives (Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher 2013).

Institutional Concerns Regarding Equity Crowdfunding (ECF) in the U.S.
Scholars have also tried to highlight the institutional challenges posed by the equity
crowdfunding phenomenon. Bedino and Castrataro (2012) state that the European equity
crowdfunding market is still in flux, given the presence of different national regulations. The
variance in regulatory frameworks has also been of concern the United States (Ortmans, 2015).
Recent legal studies have explored the regulatory framework currently being developed in the
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United States for the equity crowdfunding market (e.g. Schwartz 2013; Bradford 2012). These
legal studies are the only guideposts for analyzing the developing ECF phenomenon in the U.S.
However, given the recent changes that have occurred both in National and State legislation, we
contend that it is important to extend the existing literature by: (1) focusing on the evolution of
U.S. equity crowdfunding legislation and its regulatory framework, (2) enumerating and
discussing the anticipated implications for the emerging equity crowdfunding market; and (3)
depicting ECF via an emergent conceptual crowdfunding model.

THE FEDERAL EQUITY FUNDING REGULATIONS AND THE RISE OF
CROWDFUNDING
On April 15, 2012, the JOBS Act, was signed into law, effectively superseding Rule 501
of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 by allowing the “crowd” to participate in equity
investments. At present, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has finalized Titles II
and IV and has yet to finalize the Title III regulations associated with the JOBS Act. However,
one of the primary objectives of the JOBS Act is to relax regulations on small business equity
funding and private placement activities by legalizing equity crowdfunding (ECF) by nonaccredited investors. The JOBS Act allows for the creation of the crowdfund exemption,
allowing small investors to participate at any funding stage and secondly, entrepreneurs are
allowed to raise capital by direct solicitation of funds including advertising
Prior to the JOBS Act, equity crowdfunding in the U.S. had only limited applicability to
facilitating investments in start-up and small to medium enterprises (SMEs) because the
offerings did not fit into any of the pre-JOBS Act private placement exemptions under the
Securities Act or under applicable state securities or blue sky laws, which regulate the offering
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and sale of securities to protect investors from fraud. While successful ventures, such as Google,
Apple, and Facebook, have the potential to provide high returns for investors, many ventures do
fail during their formative years, with investors losing their capital. Various studies have shown
that 75% to 90% of start-ups fail (Gage 2012). Due to the high risk involved when investing in
new ventures, the government developed regulations to protect investors whereby start-up
investment opportunities have been limited to "accredited investors.” The federal securities laws
define the term “accredited investor” (AI) in Rule 501 of Regulation D and detail the various
types of accredited investors, such as individuals, banks, insurance companies, registered
investment companies, business development companies, or small business investment
companies. The parameters for accredited investors also indicate that these investors must
possess a minimum liquid net worth of at least $1 million, excluding the value of a primary
residence, or an annual income of $200,000 ($300,000 with a spouse). What is clear from the
above definition of SEC “accredited investors” is that AI’s are thus composed of only high net
worth/high income individuals or large institutional investors. Therefore, the general population
or “Crowd” has not been privy to equity investments of any type or size.

Review of New SEC Guidelines: Title IV (Regulation A+) and Title III
The new guidelines are expected to ensure that the new rules will achieve their intended
effect on private capital formation while still protecting investors from fraud (McDermontt, Will,
and Emory 2013). According to Fowler (2015) the SEC equity crowdfunding (ECF) guidelines
in Title IV (Regulation A+) state that:
(1) Entrepreneurs are allowed to solicit and publicize their pursuit of equity funding.
(2) Companies may offer and sell securities through a crowdfunding portal so long as
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transactions comply with certain requirements via Section 4(6) (the “Crowdfunding
Exemption”). Only companies that (a) are domestic entities, (b) are not subject to the reporting
and registration requirements of the Exchange Act (Tier II exemption from reporting and
registration, however, there is a 2 year transitional time period and the issuer must have less than
$50 million in revenues at last completed fiscal year), and (c) are not investment companies.
(3) Crowdfunding transactions in Tier 1 may raise up to $20 million in Regulation A offerings in
any 12 month period. Tier 2 consists of up to $50 million in Regulation A offerings in any 12
month period. (4) Anyone within the “Crowd” may invest. The guidelines do not require
investors to be U.S. Accredited Investors. For Tier 1 investments, which have a lower cap, there
is no investment limit on investors. However, additional Tier 2 requirements include a limitation
on the amount of securities, non -accredited investors can purchase in a Tier 2 offering. An
investor may purchase no more than (a) 10% of the greater of annual income or new worth
(natural person); or (b) 10% of the greater of annual revenue or new assets at fiscal year (for nonnatural persons). (5) The bad actor rules disqualify certain issuers and other market participants
from using Rule 506 if certain “bad actors” are participating in the offering. (6) Tier 2 also
requires additional financial disclosure and ongoing reporting requirements. (Please refer to
Appendix 1 for a comparison of JOBS Act Title II, III, and IV (A+) regulations).
Furthermore, as of October 30, 2015, the SEC voted on the proposed rules under the
JOBS Act to permit companies to offer and sell securities through crowdfunding, but Title III will
officially not become effective until January 29, 2016 (SEC 2015). Title III of the Jobs Act is
designed to allow non-accredited investors to invest and participate in start-up businesses by
effectively establishing the foundation for a regulatory structure that will enable entities to use
crowdfunding. Title III also creates and requires a new entity, a funding portal, to allow Internet-
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based platforms or intermediaries to facilitate the offer and sale of securities without the need to
register with the SEC as brokers. These measures are intended to facilitate small businesses in
raising capital while at the same time protecting investors.
Title III SEC guidelines state: (1) Issuers are limited to raising $1 million per year; (2)
the offering is available to the general public with no limit to the number of investors; (3) Issuers
do not need to comply to individual state’s filing and disclosure requirements; (4) All solicitation
to investors must be done through a portal or a broker dealer intermediary registered with the SEC
and FINRA; (5) Investors with income or new worth above $100,000 can invest up to 10% of
their net worth or income up to $100,000. Investors with income or net worth below $100,000
may invest the greater of $2000 or 5% of annual income or net worth; (6) Some financial
disclosure is required by issuers including GAAP financial statements for past two years
(crowdexpert.com 2015).
Overall, the private placement exemptions from the Securities Act of 1933 have provided
a narrow bandwidth for start-ups to raise capital, given accredited investor wealth requirements,
and the prohibition on general solicitations by start-ups. According to a recent survey, 97% of
U.S. respondents noted they would invest in startups given the opportunity. However, 63% of
respondents don't qualify as Accredited Investors ($200k/year in income or $1 Million plus in the
bank) (Alois 2015). However, Title III will effectively allow this large group of individuals an
opportunity to invest in early stage companies, which were previously reserved for wealthier
investors. The JOBS Act, was specifically designed to facilitate small investments by many
people with the expectation of creating a larger pool of investment funding. This larger pool of
funds from the “Crowd” not only infuses the equity financing continuum with new capital, but it
also ultimately produces greater “democratization” of equity capital across a larger spectrum of
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the population (Blechman 2012).
STATE LAWS PERTAINING TO CROWDFUNDING
With the passing of the JOBS ACT and even prior to the promulgation of the SEC
rulings, U.S. states enacted, and indeed are continuing to enact, their own crowdfunding
exemption laws for intrastate investment offerings that are exempt from federal SEC regulation.
As of August 2015, 29 states and the District of Colombia have either enacted separate intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions or have enacted amendments to their existing blue sky laws to permit
some type of intrastate crowdfunding (Zeoli 2015). These states are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado,
DC, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Eight other states are either in the process of
enacting or considering legislation regarding intrastate crowdfunding, and they are: Alaska,
Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, and West Virginia
(crowdfundinglegalhub.com 2015). At present, 4 states have rejected proposed intrastate
crowdfunding, California, Florida, North Carolina, and Utah. However, given the tremendous
growth in equity crowdfunding activities throughout the world and the protracted formulation of
SEC regulations, it is highly likely that more states will pass their own legislation to allow equity
crowdfunding. Therefore, it is important and indeed timely to review equity crowdfunding
legislation at all governmental levels in the U.S.
U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE COMPARISION
After reviewing the current legislation, we identified eight critical departures between
federal and state crowdfunding legislation. They are comprised of: registration, limits on
offerings, investment caps on issuers; preemption, requirements on notification, regulations on the
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use of intermediaries, required filings, and post offering reporting. Our analysis shows: First, that
the states’ standards for registration are similar to the federal standard but, they extend the
registration only to registered entities within the state and require solicitation of funds only from
residents within their own state. Secondly, state legislation typically mandates that the total
amount of securities an issuer may sell to individual investors shall not exceed $1 million per
year, which is reflective of federal Title III regulations (SEC 2015). Under certain investor
conditions, that investment may rise to $2 million in some states. Federal Title IV (A+), however,
has substantially expanded the issuer limits in both Tier 1 and Tier 2 as compared to the states.
Thirdly, both levels of government base their limits on the individual investor’s annual income or
net worth; however, the limits differ substantially. The current Title IV (A+) limit for Tier 1 has
no limit and Tier 2 is 10% of income or net worth (for a natural person), while states allow
investment by individuals with less than $100,000 in income or net worth and allow their
participation at a lower investment amount, as low as $2000. Fourthly, requirements on
notification are similar, and each level of government has processes that must be followed by the
issuers. Fifth, the Federal JOBS Act specifies that crowdfunding transactions must be conducted
through a broker or a “funding portal” registered with the SEC and any applicable self-regulatory
organization. Many states, however, do not require a broker or funding portal and, if used, the
only requirement is that this portal must allow the state access for a review. However, both the
states and the federal government do require specific filings. Finally, the federal government
requires, at a minimum, annual reporting of the offerings while the states generally require a
quarterly report.
As shown by this analysis, the intrastate crowdfunding regulations, although generally
mirroring the federal statutes, do provide for more expansive crowd participation at all levels.
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Moreover, although mindful of the importance of notification to investors and quarterly filings to
a state, they do not require a broker or funding portal and allow for direct solicitation via multiple
media. In essence, the state laws are more robust and efficient and seek to develop investment
vehicles within the state and attract in-state investors at all levels.
The review of both the federal and the state equity crowdfunding laws describes the legal
structures that are specifically designed to expand the infusion of capital to U.S. start-ups by
allowing the “crowd” to participate. State crowdfunding actions are thus directly related to the
recognition of significant geographic bias that was found in previous academic studies. These
governmental actions, coupled with the current knowledge of important factors related to
successful crowdfunding, lead us to several overarching implications and also to a preliminary
modeling of the impact of equity crowdfunding (ECF).

TRADITIONAL FUNDING VS. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
In order to develop a conceptual model and introduce the implications of equity
crowdfunding, it is important to review what traditional funding offers start-ups and
entrepreneurs. In traditional equity funding of start-up enterprises, a temporal path or continuum
has developed (Harrison 2013) (See Figure 1). “Pre-seed financing” generally emanates from
business plan competitions, university assistance, family, friends and savings (Mixon 2008;
Shane 2008). Pre-seed funding is a relatively small amount typically used for proof of concept
and prototype development. Second, “seed or start-up financing” expands these funding sources
to venture angels, venture angel networks, or debt financing and is provided to newly formed
companies for their use in completing product development and initial marketing (Denis 2004).
Third, “Series” financing, encompassing various stages, engages formalized investment pools
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created by venture capital firms that provide funds for company expansion and may include
plant, marketing, and working capital and, for the development of an improved product, the
introduction of a new technology or an expanded product line. Lastly, when the firm is mature
but still expanding, such financing may also be provided for a company that is expected to “go

public.” This element of series financing is called bridge financing (Metrick and Yasuda 2011).
These stages of enterprise financing form the equity-financing continuum that is illustrated in
Figure 1 below. It is, however, acknowledged that many successful start-ups have “jumped” the
continuum path by locating significant venture investors at the initial stages of development.
These instances, however, are not exemplary of most start-up companies that are searching for
initial funding.
--------------------------

Insert Figure 1 here

-----------------Presently, scholars know little about the dynamics of ECF. In particular, “we do not
know whether crowdfunding efforts reinforce or contradict existing theories about how ventures
raise capital and achieve success” (Mollick 2014, 2). However, we know that organizations and
new venture often seek financing (Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Gorman and Sahlman,
1989; Kortum and Lerner 2000), and ECF is emerging as a means for them to secure funding
beyond traditional means (Mollick 2014). However it may or may not substitute for traditional
financing. In fact, it may also be used to attract larger venture capital as in the case of Pebble and
their “smart watch”, which used Kickstarter for its initial funding but later attracted venture
funding (Dingman 2013). Nevertheless, we argue that ECF disrupts the financing life cycle
because it tends to be predominately in new projects at early stages of development (Mollick
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2014) and it is anticipated that this disintermediation will compress the financial supply chain
from “months to days” (Miller 2013) and potentially reduce the current transactions costs for
startup ventures to raise capital.
Thus, ECF, via government legislation, now provides a structural element for start-up
funding rather than the continuation of the randomness of the private equity market. As shown
in Figure 2 below, we contend that ECF will be introduced primarily during the Pre-seed and
Seed elements of the continuum (likely after business plan finalization and before or during
prototype development, Alpha and Beta testing). It is anticipated that the latter series of
elements of the continuum may include an ECF component but are more likely to be funded by
the more traditional and formal investment pools made up of accredited investors.
--------------------------

Insert Figure 2 here

-----------------The difference between a traditional venture capital firm and an online venture platform,
such as the FundersClub, the first online venture capital platform (Grant 2013), is that investors
get more exposure to pre-vetted opportunities then they did in the past, where such opportunities
were only presented to a select group of wealthy investors. Other online start-up investment
platforms for accredited investors have also emerged, including AngelList, Microventures,
WeFunder, and Circleup, and the quality of available start-ups and the amount of value provided
by them has thus varied by the platform being used. However, as progressive as FundersClub
and other venture platforms have been, their focus is still accredited investors. As of yet, in the
U.S. the “crowd” has not had the opportunity to pursue active investing via these online sites,
and accredited investors participating in the sites are not investing in start-ups and small
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businesses. Presently, there are approximately 8.6 million accredited investors in the U.S., but
only 3% of these investors are currently investing in start-ups and small businesses (Alois 2013).
Over the last ten years, there has been a significant retraction in the capital markets with
small businesses not having access to the capital to start and fund their business development
(Mills 2014). Therefore, crowdfunding can assist entrepreneurs by offering more access to
capital, especially when traditional financing is not readily available (Bruton et al. 2015). As
such, crowdfunding platforms can supplement other aspects of private investing and increase the
flow of entrepreneurial capital (Financial Conduct Authority 2014). For example, by examining
the current average size per transaction on Crowdfund platforms, such as CircleUp, and then
taking into consideration the expected acceleration to the “repeat purchase” rate, as well as, the
addition to the total amount of investable capital, the total market potential for equity
crowdfunding today has a tremendous potential that can exceed many times that of any current
online marketplace (Conner 2012). According to the JOBS Act Reg D, the market represents
$1.3 trillion dollars (regdresources 2015).
Using equity crowdfunding (ECF) as a new funding platform effectively creates a new
asset class wherein shares are issued via SEC registered crowdfunding portals or individual state
crowdfunding investment platforms. Although not defined by the strict definition of an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) that requires significant preparation and oversight, crowdfunding,
nevertheless, mirrors an IPO, whereby, the “crowd” is privy to initial company equity on a public
platform via an electronic medium. The number of crowdfunding platforms in the U.S. is
increasing every year (Mass solutions 2015). Currently, there are approximately 191
crowdfunding platforms in the U.S. (Statista.com, 2015), 56 equity crowdfunding (ECF)
platforms (Neiss 2012), and as of August 2015, 29 states that have either enacted intrastate
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crowdfunding exemptions or enacted amendments to their existing blue sky laws, which regulate
the buying and selling of securities, to permit some type of intrastate crowdfunding (Mihalik and
Lawson 2015). These ECF platforms can substitute for the more traditional intermediaries
between supply and demand. We thus argue that crowdfunding can have macro-level
implications as proposed by the literature but it can also have micro- or firm-level implications.
Based on commonalities in the existing research we have reviewed coupled with implications
from government regulation, we contend that with the enactment and implementation of federal
crowdfunding and the acceleration in state initiated intrastate crowdfunding, the following will
occur:
Proposition 1: Total equity seed funding will increase with the addition of ECF.
With the elimination of significant restrictions on issuers, as well as, the predominate use of
Internet portals and direct solicitation, proposition 2 follows:
Proposition 2: Time to fund will be compressed with the addition of ECF
With the increased usage by issuers of low cost Internet portals and the decrease in costs of
registration and reporting, proposition 3 follows:
Proposition 3: Transactions costs will decrease with the addition of ECF
Figure 3 below demonstrates the proposed impact of crowdfunding. The y-axis shows
Total Funding ($), while the x-axis measures Time from “funding ask at T0 to funding close at
Tn”. The area under Arc 2 (NCF, non-equity crowdfunding curve) shows total equity funding
under the “traditional” equity funding methods during pre-seed and seed stages. Arc 1 depicts
the addition of equity crowdfunding (ECF) resulting in the NCF+ECF arc. As illustrated in
Figure 3, total equity funding is the area under each arc. As shown, the area under Arc 1, is
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greater with the addition of equity crowdfunding and the time to fund is compressed from T2 to
T1.
--------------------------

Insert Figure 3 here

-----------------Figure 4 below shows an alternative representation, whereby the NCF with the addition
of equity crowdfunding (ECF) rotates the logistic funding curve upward to depict an acceleration
of funding per time period due to efficiencies in the portal/platform facility, ability to solicit, and
disintermediation (especially in intrastate equity crowdfunding). Once again, NCF+ECF
illustrates that “time to funding” compresses from T2 to T1. At time T1, point A shows that total
equity funding along the NCF+ECF curve at $1 is greater than NCF equity funding $2 at point
B. If equity funding increases along the NCF curve, the $1 level of funding would not occur
until point C, thus requiring a longer period to fund at T2.

--------------------------

Insert Figure 4 here

-----------------Implications:


Equity Funding is greater, $1 > $2, at deal closing and



“Time to Fund” is compressed, T1<T2;
Based on implications from the literature and from the expected implications of

government regulations, the diagrams above represent our concepts and constructs regarding the
impact of equity crowdfunding with regard to the temporal equity-financing continuum. We
contend that the potential ECF impact is an expansion of capital to start-ups at all initial levels of
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the financing continuum, a compression of the arc time line from “funding ask to investment,”
and a reduction of transactions costs. As a corollary, we also propose that equity crowdfunding
will spread the level of risk across a larger pool of investors. Tysiac in 2014 showed that
investors recalibrate their portfolios to reflect a risk spread among the traditional sources of
investment allocations and ECF platform allocations. Moreover, since there will potentially be
more investors, the risk will be spread over the larger pool, thus mitigating the risk. Data to test
these propositions still await the final implementation of Title IV equity crowdfunding
regulations by the SEC, and operations by crowdfunding portals on both the national and state
levels as well as the construction of data sets either from annual reports or national surveys of
ECF portals.
DISCUSSION
With ECF crowdfunding being allowed in the U.S. we recognize that it has many new
implications for small and medium enterprises. At present we can only make limited statements
regarding ECF because there are many unresolved questions (Burtch, Benedetto, and Mudambi
2014), which merit further research. However, we contend that ECF in the U.S. may have both
positive micro and macro externalities that emanate from the promulgation of both state and
federal equity crowdfunding legislation. For example, some of the positive influences that ECF
may have are to:
(1) Increase the rate of business start-ups. Equity Crowdfunding has the potential to be an
efficient fundraising vehicle for start-ups and other small companies because it provides a
new, relatively inexpensive means to find investors outside of the traditional pre-seed and
seed rounds that have traditionally focused on angel investors or multiple friends and
family. ECF transactions provide companies with the ability to attract investment from,
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“retail” investors who ordinarily cannot be included in traditional private placements (Miller
2014; NSBA 2012).
(2) Encompass a wider range of potential projects and founding goals (Mollick 2014).
Crowdfunding also has the potential to be a very attractive fundraising vehicle for start-ups
and other small companies because it provides them with a new, relatively inexpensive
means to find investors outside of the traditional pre-seed and seed rounds that have
traditionally focused on angel investors or multiple friends and family.
(3) Decrease the failure rate of small businesses. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
almost half of all start-up businesses fail within two years due to a lack of funding
alternatives. Minority entrepreneurs in particular, tend to have more difficulty accessing
capital (Ekanam and Wyer 2007; Gaskill, Van Auken, and Manning 1993; Hisrick and
Brusch 1986). ECF may provide a viable alternative to traditional funding for that group.
According to Stemler (2013), crowdfunding is “uniquely positioned to assist two groups of
people in securing the money and support their needs: (a) entrepreneurs trying to turn their
ideas into viable businesses, and (b) small business owners trying to keep their businesses
afloat or get them to grow” (272) thereby increasing the rate of business start-ups and
decreasing the rate of small business failures.
(4) Create greater job creation. Increases in employment will likely follow, as start-ups increase
their viability and growth in the United States. According to the U.S. Small Business
Administration, the largest employment sector in the U.S. is small business. It accounts for
55% of the workforce (SBA.gov. 2015), and ECF may allow this sector to expand even
further.
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(5) Increase business funding outside major urban areas or innovation hubs. This assumption is a
function of the new state crowdfunding laws. The democratization of equity funding, thus,
applies not only to an expansion of investors/owners, but also to an expansion of funding to
businesses “between the two coasts.” (Agrawal 2011; Lin and Viswanathan 2013; Sohl 1999;
Stuart and Xu 2003).
(6) Offers non-financial benefits. According to companies like FUZ Design, the “moneygathering crusade spawned widespread coverage on tech blogs, which led in turn to hundreds
of offers of help with marketing, design, manufacturing, and distribution” (Alsever 2015). In
fact, most entrepreneurs now rank these other benefits as having higher value than the actual
funds that are garnered (Alsever 2015). Indeed, money tends to rank fourth or fifth in status
for most companies (Alsever 2015). Often these firms will gain access to new followers and
advisors that then provide valuable feedback on all aspects of their companies.
In addition the positive externalities, however, it is also possible that certain negative
externalities may arise from equity crowdfunding. These negative externalities are likely to
emanate from the requirements of the Federal JOBS ACT as interpreted by SEC rulings.
Crowdfunding may:
(1) Cause companies to spend more time in educating investors. Companies who are selling
securities pursuant to a crowdfunding offering may find themselves with a large base of
“crowd” investors that may require them to expend more time and resources on their
shareholder communications and investor relations than might otherwise be the case (e.g.,
additional solicitation efforts when seeking shareholder action and more regular reporting of
financial and business results) (Fields 2013).
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(2) Add institutional costs to the disclosure process. Tier 2 investments will require both offering
and post-offering disclosure requirements that might not be required by companies who are
raising private equity capital by other means (including the ongoing annual financial
disclosure that will be required) (Cheung 1987). However, at present it is not clear that this
change will add much cost to the disclosure process used for other exempt offerings (Fields
2013). However, in addition, companies engaging in an equity crowdfunding offering,
pursuant to the Crowdfunding Exemption, will be required by the federal legislation (not
necessarily state legislation) to hire intermediaries (portals/platforms) to conduct the
transactions, which may also map to added transaction costs (Dalhman 1979).
(3) Not be attractive to latter stage investors. As companies already engaged in a pre-seed or seed
equity crowdfunding offering move along the equity financing continuum, they are likely to
need or want to attract later round financing. Venture capital, private equity, or institutional
financing sources may be reluctant to invest in an entity with a large base of “crowd”
investors. They may prefer to deal with a traditionally smaller and more restricted class of
accredited investors. Furthermore, if the company engages in a merger or acquisition, this
action will need shareholder approval from their large base. Although these capital
expansions would likely occur at later stages of company development, these transactions will
require substantial shareholder communication that may be difficult to manage. This issue
could potentially limit some companies from accessing capital at various stages of
development unless the venture clearly demonstrates the efficiencies of share/unit holder
information conduits via their own well-designed Internet platforms (Stocker 2012).
However, the above predictions of negative externalities may be substantially mitigated.
Crowdfunding is an Internet- based phenomenon, and the Internet will likely solve many of the
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above cited issues. For example, start-ups and small businesses that are savvy about the impact
of the Internet will likely create websites containing information blogs and other outreach tools
to target their market customers. They may also use special log-in sections to communicate with
their stockholders. These mechanisms can also be developed and maintained at a very low cost.
Overall, The new federal and state legislation on ECF has the potential to significantly
increase the pool of potential investors available in the marketplace, as well as, the options
available to small companies who are seeking financing. However, it is yet undetermined if it
will act as a substitute for traditional means of financing or replace it in the near future. What is
evident is that in the near future, the funding volume will continue to increase, new platforms
will emerge while others cease to exist, and that a consolidation will ultimately occur in the
market. Moreover, the federal and state legislation, regarding ECF will provide for more
expansive total investments by developing a more efficient crowdfunding architecture and
leveraging the geographic biases examined by Agrawal (2011). Some early-stage start-up
companies may also use crowdfunding companies such as Kickstarter to fund pre-sales of their
products (Wortham 2012), test their business ideas (Mollick 2014), get feedback about their
product from the crowd awareness (Blohm et al. 2013; Giercak et al 2016), while others may use
ECF as an alternative to their more conventional sources of funding (Stemler 2013; Yoichiro
2012). Especially for early stage companies that may not have sufficient availability of equity
capital, the new U.S. legislation may allow them access to other useful sources. Rather than
using an investment banker or other financial intermediary, they will be able to use ECF portals
(Miller 2014) and potentially decrease time to fund and increase initial capital. Further, the
investment banking community and the financial intermediary communities will likely make
changes to meet the growth of crowdfunding as more new innovations in interest rates,
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instruments, and offerings are developed (Hemingway 2012). Crowdfunding is a dilated model
of what disintermediated investment banking could look like (Rubinton 2011). Some
organizations may choose to participate in this new venue by creating “clearing house” websites
that enable investors to choose from a selection of offerings, or they may want to create
restricted access portals for a particular level of investor. Existing entities that have offered
access to pre-qualified accredited investors through restricted access internet portals will likely
need to revise their vetting procedures if they wish to attract equity crowdfunders (Cifrino,
Conaghan, Laurenson, Leder, Murphy, Orsic, Rochwarger, and Swartz 2013).
In spite of its limitations and obligations, ECF has the potential to provide many
companies access to investors that they would not have been able to reach through traditional
private placements prior to the passing of the JOBS Act or state ECF laws. Companies that are
willing to comply with the JOBS Act or state requirements will be able to use ECF portals to find
investors previously unavailable to them (McDermott 2012). Particularly for entrepreneurs,
small businesses, and project-based initiatives, ECF has the potential to become a viable
fundraising vehicle and a major alternative to traditional financing methods, such as banks loans,
business angels, or venture capitalists, all of which are not always accessible to these entities.
CONCLUSION & DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper has compared traditional equity based financing regulations to the new federal
JOBS Act and offered a comparison between federal and state laws as they pertain to
crowdfunding. In addition, the paper has provided a conceptual framework depicting how
crowdfunding may change the traditional equity-financing continuum, and also presented various
externalities that may emanate from the implementation of crowdfunding. However, due to the
limited scholarly research that is currently available on ECF within the U.S., it is our hope that
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this study will foster more discussion and once data is available, empirical research in the field.
Moreover, we hope that more empirical research will be conducted to test our hypotheses, as
well as the crowdfunding micro and macro externalities. We contend that the enumerated
externalities in this study have the potential to generate multiple implications that can provide
researchers with a diverse and critical set of future data-based research efforts.
While, ECF is still a relatively young market (Lambert and Schweinbacher 2010), particularly in
the U.S, it is imperative that we gain a better understanding of the impact it will have on the
economy by conducting more empirically based research. (Bruton et al 2015). It is also our hope
that future information retrieved from ECF platforms and state security commissions within the
U.S. will provide the data required to conduct the empirical testing of the conceptual model
presented in this paper and to determine the overall effectiveness of equity crowdfunding in
fostering economic development.
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